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THE TIME HAS COME: THE UNITED STATES, CUBA, AND 
THE END OF THE EMBARGO 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 7, 1962, President John F. Kennedy, acting under the 
authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,1 issued Proclamation 
3447.2 Titled “Embargo on All Trade with Cuba,” the proclamation ex-
claimed that the “United States, in accordance with its international obli-
gations, is prepared to take all necessary actions to promote national and 
hemispheric security by isolating the present Government of Cuba and 
thereby reducing the threat posed by its alignment with the communist 
powers.”3 The proclamation declared an embargo on all trade between 
Cuba and the United States,4 including “the importation into the United 
States of all goods of Cuban origin and all goods imported from or 
through Cuba.”5  
President Kennedy’s move to ban trade with Cuba was an extension 
of an order by President Eisenhower that embargoed all exports to Cuba 
made in October 19606 This proclamation drew a bright line in the sand 
with respect to United States foreign policy that has directed Cuban-
American relations for the past fifty-three years. Despite the occasional 
thaw in relations and attempts to de-escalate the tension in the relation-
ship—particularly during the Carter administration in the 1970s—the 
embargo on trade with Cuba has existed since that fateful day. The Unit-
ed States has refused to end the embargo until Cuba holds democratic 
elections, Cuba restores basic human and political rights, and a Castro-
led Communist government no longer rules Cuba.7 On December 17, 
2014, reversing over fifty years of American foreign policy, President 
Obama, declaring a “New Course on Cuba,” announced major alterations 
  
 1. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (repealed 1978). 
 2. Proclamation No. 3447 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (February 7, 1962); reprinted 76 Stat. 1446 
(1962). 
 3. Proclamation No. 3447 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (February 7, 1962); reprinted 76 Stat. 1446 
(1962). 
 4. Claire Suddath, A Brief History of U.S.-Cuba Relations, TIME (Apr. 15, 2009), available 
at http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891359,00.html (explaining that licensed sale 
of food and medical supplies were excluded from the embargo until the mid 1960s). 
 5. Proclamation No. 3447 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (February 7, 1962); reprinted 76 Stat. 1446 
(1962). 
 6. Gary Clyde Hufbauer et. al., Case 60-3:  US v. Cuba (1960-: Castro), PETERSON 
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1 (last updated October 2011), available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/sanctions-cuba-60-3.pdf [hereinafter Hufbauer]. 
 7. 22 U.S.C. § 6065(a)(7) (2012) (adding, among many other conditions, the United States 
Congress, through the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, established that the 
embargo cannot be lifted until a government has been formed that does not include Fidel Castro or 
his brother Raul). 
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to United States Policy towards Cuba.8 Acknowledging the failure of 
past United States policy, the President recognized that “decades of U.S. 
isolation of Cuba have failed to accomplish our objective of empowering 
Cubans to build an open and democratic country.”9 
In this article I will examine the motivations and justifications for 
the embargo, specifically the evolving rationalization provided by the 
United States in implementing the sanctions, from expropriation of 
American property, to national security, and finally to human rights and 
the spread of democracy. The article will also discuss the effects of the 
embargo on Cuba, especially: the economy, the health of the population, 
and the healthcare sector of Cuba, its effect on the United States’ rela-
tionship with the rest of the world, and the continued struggle about the 
policy in the domestic political arena. Lastly, this article will discuss the 
current relationship between the two countries, specifically addressing 
the movements made by both the Obama administration and the govern-
ment of Raul Castro to open up diplomatic relations and reduce the scope 
of the economic embargo.  
A Chronology of the Embargo 
While the proclamation President Kennedy executed is widely rec-
ognized as the moment when the embargo began, several events preced-
ed it that set the stage for President Kennedy’s eventual decision to im-
plement the embargo. The embargo was not a unilateral measure im-
posed by the American government but the result of a long chain of hos-
tile policies of the two countries,10 each ratcheting up the tension, creat-
ing a confrontational and adversarial atmosphere that eventually resulted 
in a total breakdown in bilateral relations.  
The United States had long been involved in Cuban affairs before 
the Cuban Revolution and the rise of Fidel Castro. The United States 
invested heavily in Cuba during Spanish rule and continued to hold sig-
nificant interest in the island when the Cuban War of Independence be-
gan.11 The explosion of the United States battleship Maine in Havana 
harbor in February 1898 caused the United States to intervene in the Cu-
ban War of Independence,12 and end it by August of the same year.13 
This event marked the beginning of heavy United States involvement in 
  
 8. Charting a New Course on Cuba, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 18, 2015 5:26 PM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. HELEN OSIEJA, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: 
 THE CASE OF THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA 1 (2006) [hereinafter OSIEJA]. 
 11. JULIA E. SWEIG, CUBA:  WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 9 (2009) [hereinafter SWEIG] 
(explaining that when the war broke out in 1895, 95% of Cuba’s sugar exports were destined for the 
United States) 
 12. Id. at 8 (explaining that the Cuban War of Independence is known as the Spanish-
American War in the United States). 
 13. Id. at 10.  
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Cuban affairs until the Cuban Revolution. The Cuban Constitution of 
1904, enacted after Cuba won its independence from Spain and the sub-
sequent American military occupation, contained the Platt Amendment, 
which constrained Cuba from conducting its own foreign affairs and in-
ternational financial matters,14 as well as granting the United States the 
right to intervene in Cuba and establish naval bases. Specifically, Article 
III required that the government of Cuba consent to the right of the Unit-
ed States to intervene in Cuban affairs for  
The preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a 
government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual 
liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed 
by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and un-
dertaken by the Government of Cuba.15  
While the Cuban government repealed the Platt Amendment in 
1934 and replaced it with a treaty that allowed the United States to retain 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,16 the influence of the United States gov-
ernment in Cuban affairs continued until its break with Fidel Castro in 
the 1960s. 
After the Cuban Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the regime 
of Fulgencio Batista,17 in an effort to maintain cordial relations between 
the two countries, the United States immediately recognized the new 
Cuban government.18 After an initial period of calm relations between 
the two countries, the Cuban government, under the influence of Fidel 
Castro, began to align itself closer with the Soviet Union. This behavior 
led the United States to reduce the sugar quota to Cuba and instruct 
American oil firms not to refine crude oil supplied by the Soviet Union.19 
  
 14. Id. at 11-12. 
 15. Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Cuba Embodying the Provisions 
Defining Their Future Relations as Contained in the Act of Congress Approved March 2, 1901, 
U.S.-Cuba, May 22, 1903; General Records of the United States Government, 1778–2006, RG 11, 
National Archives. 
 16. Lester H. Woolsey, The New Cuban Treaty, 28 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 530, 533 (1934) (dis-
cussing the treaty of relations signed between the two countries and the extension of the lease on the 
naval base at Guantanamo Bay). 
 17. SWEIG, supra note 11, at 16–27 (Fulgencio Batista was a sergeant in the Cuban Army who 
helped lead the “Sergeants’ Revolt” in 1933, toppling the provincial regime of Carlos Manuel de 
Cespedes. Batista did not take power himself, choosing instead to remain in the background and 
influence events behind the scenes until 1940, when he did run and win the presidency. He served 
from1940–1944. He chose to run for the presidency again in 1952 and, realizing that he would not 
win, he initiated another coup and assumed power as a dictator. His reign as dictator was marred by 
authoritarian control of the press, university, and congress, as well as embezzlement of huge sums 
from the soaring economy. Batista’s coup in 1952 created a new generation of revolutionaries that 
felt that “brittle democratic institutions, polarization, and corruption had made the path of electoral 
politics a dead end.” This perspective contributed to the creation of the revolutionary movement that 
would ultimately topple Batista on New Year’s Eve 1958); Fulgencio Batista, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA (2015), available at http://www.britannica.com/biography/Fulgencio-Batista. 
 18. Hufbauer, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that the United States recognized the revolutionary 
government on January 7, 1959). 
 19. Id. at 1. 
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In response to these actions, the Cuban government subsequently execut-
ed a series of government actions that slowly expropriated the assets of 
American citizens in Cuba. Each expropriation, a reaction to a measure 
taken by the United States that Cuba perceived as an encroachment on 
Cuba’s sovereignty.  
The Cuban government’s reaction to the reduction of the sugar quo-
ta was to adopt Law No. 851, which characterized the United States ac-
tion as an “act of aggression.”20 Cuban Law No. 851 empowered the 
Cuban President and Prime Minister to nationalize, by forced expropria-
tion, property or enterprises in which American nationals possessed an 
interest—a power that Fidel Castro exercised immediately.21 In October 
of 1960, President Eisenhower, further escalating the situation, imposed 
an embargo on exports to Cuba, reduced the sugar quota to zero and 
blacklisted vessels carrying cargo to and from Cuba from carriage of 
United States government-financed cargo.22 When, in January of 1961, 
Fidel Castro acknowledged his affiliation with Marxist-Leninism and 
described the revolution as socialist and anti-imperialist, the United 
States had heard enough and severed diplomatic relations and restricted 
travel to Cuba.23 
The Bay of Pigs Invasion24 in April 1961 exacerbated the problem 
and increased the already heightened tensions between the two countries. 
The attempted overthrow of Fidel Castro pushed him further into the 
arms of the Soviet Union and only served to increase his well-founded 
paranoia that the United States would stop at nothing to remove him 
from power and reverse the Cuban Revolution. The situation came to a 
head with the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba in October of 1962 
and the resulting Cuban Missile Crisis.25 The agreement reached between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, which ended the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, established a policy of disengagement from the United States in 
relation to the Cuban government. Part of the agreement to end the crisis 
was a commitment from the United States not to invade Cuba or overtly 
attempt the overthrow of the Castro regime. However, while the United 
States would not take any overt action to remove Fidel Castro from pow-
er, the agreement did not deter it from engaging in continued pressure on 
  
 20. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Embargo or Blockade? The Legal and Moral Dimen-
sions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba, 4 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 53, 64 (2009) 
[hereinafter Hernandez-Truyol]. 
 21. Id. at 64. 
 22. Hufbauer, supra note 6, at 1.  
 23. Danielle Renwick, U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 4, 
2015), http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113. 
 24. JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/The-Bay-of-Pigs.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2015 6:09 
PM) (explaining the Bay of Pigs Invasion was a failed military invasion of Cuba undertaken by a 
CIA-sponsored force of Cuban exiles on April 17, 1961). 
 25. Id. 
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the Cuban government through further economic measures and less 
overt, non-military actions.  
Since the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, every American admin-
istration until the current one, has kept up a near constant reign of pres-
sure against the Cuban government in an attempt to either alter its behav-
ior or remove it from power completely. The methods various admin-
istrations have employed to enforce the regime have included: invoking 
the Trading with the Enemy Act, which froze all Cuban assets in the 
United States;26 the banishment of Cuba from the Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS);27 the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992;28 
the passage of the Libertad Act of 1996;29 and the passage of the Trade 
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act.30 These acts, along with 
severing diplomatic relations with Cuba and including it on the list of 
state sponsors of terrorism, have succeeded in alienating Cuba from the 
United States, even if they have not accomplished the objectives of the 
embargo. This pattern of antagonism and confrontation by both sides has 
continued for over fifty years, and the Obama and Raul Castro admin-
istrations’ have only recently been interrupted this pattern because of a 
desire to normalize relations between the two countries. These efforts 
represent the first truly deliberate attempts to change the status quo and 
redefine the relationship in over half a century.  
Overview of Economic Sanctions against Cuba 
The United States Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC), which oversees and imposes penalties—even occasion-
ally grants licenses to permit activities covered by the sanctions—
imposes the primary regulations of United States sanctions against Cu-
  
 26. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–44 (2012) (the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 prohibits any 
American citizen from trading with, transporting, or carrying any letter or writing of an enemy of the 
United Sates, as defined by the statute.  It was amended in 1977 to only apply to wartime activities 
but the sanctions against Cuba were grandfathered in). 
 27. Hufbauer, supra note 6, at 3, 23 (in July of 1975, the OAS adopted a resolution to allow 
individual members to reestablish relations with Cuba pursuant to national interests and policy. On 
June 3, 2009, the OAS lifted the ban imposed in January 1962 that removed Cuba from the organiza-
tion because of its adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology, which was deemed incompatible with the 
inter-American system). 
 28. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–10 (2012) (the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 was an attempt to 
tighten the embargo in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union by prohibiting foreign-base subsidiar-
ies of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba, as well as further restricting travel to Cuba by U.S. 
citizens and remittances by Cuban Americans to family members in Cuba). 
 29. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–91 (2012) (the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 
was a further escalation of the embargo by the United States. Along with codifying much of the 
embargo, it also extended (controversially) the territorial application of the initial embargo to apply 
to foreign companies trading with Cuba, as well as attempting to cover property formerly owned by 
U.S. citizens but confiscated by the Cuban government after the revolution).  
 30. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201–11 (2012) (the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act 
prohibits any United States citizen from providing “payment or financing terms for sales of agricul-
tural commodities or products to Cuba” except “payment of cash in advance” or “financing by third 
country financial institutions.” The act also prohibits any “tourist” travel to Cuba). 
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ba.,31 Penalties for violating the sanctions can be either civil or criminal 
and can include large fines and even imprisonment for severe viola-
tions.32  
Under the sanctions imposed by the United States against Cuba, 
with some limited exceptions, it is unlawful for any “person . . . subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States”33 to do business with or in Cu-
ba.34 The distinction “subject to the jurisdiction” is quite broad and al-
lows the United States government to extend the reach of the sanctions 
quite expansively. The term covers four distinct classes of people and 
entities. The first class is any citizen or lawful permanent resident of the 
United States.35 This jurisdiction extends to wherever that person may be 
located, wherever they go, and regardless of whom they work for.36 The 
second class covered by the regulations is any person, regardless of na-
tionality, who is physically present in the United States.37 The third class 
is any company organized under the laws of the United States, or any 
state, and that company’s foreign branches, wherever located.38 The last 
class is any entity “owned or controlled” by a United States citizen, a 
permanent resident, or a United States organized company, including 
foreign organized subsidiaries of United States companies.39  
These classes of people and entities covered by the sanctions are 
quite comprehensive and have caused tremendous amounts of conflict 
both within the United States and internationally. Some criticisms of the 
sanctions include the right of the United States to extend its jurisdiction 
extraterritorially, to restrict the travel of its citizens, and to prevent Unit-
ed States businesses from engaging in certain activities, severely restrict-
ing their ability to compete successfully in a truly international business 
arena. Many American companies, especially agricultural producers, 
have joined the chorus of opposition to the embargo, arguing for its de-
mise in order to open up new markets for their goods.40 
  
 31. Scott Maberry, Overview of U.S. Economic Sanctions, 17 CURRENTS:  INT’L TRADE L. J. 
52 (2008–2009). 
 32. 31 C.F.R. § 501.701 (2015); 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2012). 
 33. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(a)(1) (2015). 
 34. Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 20, at 53. 
 35. 31 C.F.R. § 515.329(a) (2015). 
 36. 31 C.F.R. § 515.330(a) (2015). 
 37. 31 C.F.R. § 515.330(a)(2) (2015). 
 38. 31 C.F.R. § 515.329(d) (2015). 
 39. 31 C.F.R. § 515.329(d) (2015). 
 40. FLYNN ADCOCK ET. AL., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO CUBA, 
41 (2001).  (certain estimates calculate that if the embargo were removed agricultural exports could 
reach $1.24 billion annually and that exports to Cuba could stimulate an additional $3.8 billion in 
total economic output, with $2.8 billion in direct and indirect impacts and another $818 million in 
household income). 
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Retaliation for Expropriation of American Property 
The United States government has provided multiple reasons as to 
why it instituted the initial trade restrictions in 1960 and why it continues 
the full embargo today. During the Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, it justified the embargo with the need to maintain 
national security and prevent the expansion of Communism in the West-
ern Hemisphere. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of 
Communism, the rationale focused on humanitarianism, particularly cen-
tered on the notion of human rights and the spread of democracy. The 
United States has accused the Cuban government, first under Fidel Cas-
tro and now under Raul Castro, of widespread human rights abuses, spe-
cifically the repression of expression, restriction of travel, large-scale 
incarceration of political opponents and other arbitrary detentions and 
short-term imprisonments.41 However, none of these reasons explains 
why the United States instituted the initial restrictive trade measures in 
1960. The United States imposed those measures not because of national 
security or humanitarian interests but because of economic interests.  
The United States initiated the original trade restrictions in retalia-
tion for Cuba’s nationalization of American businesses and expropriation 
of American property in Cuba. This has been the one unifying rationale 
for the implementation and continuation of the embargo, having survived 
the changes in reasoning and been used to justify every congressional 
and administrative action against Cuba relating to the sanctions since 
their inception.42 
After Cuba signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union to sup-
ply it with sugar in exchange for crude oil, the United States cancelled 
the its sugar quota with Cuba and instructed United States oil firms not to 
refine the oil provided by the Soviet Union.43 These actions had a dra-
matic effect on the Cuban economy, especially in relation to the reduc-
tion in the sugar quota. At this point in time, Cuba was the world’s larg-
est exporter of sugar, accounting for thirty-three percent of total world 
sugar exports in 1959.44 Sugar exports contributed twenty-five percent of 
Cuba’s national income and more than eighty percent of its total export 
revenue.45  
The United States designed and implemented these initial sanctions 
to weaken the Cuban economy and influence Castro’s behavior towards 
  
 41. World Report 2014: Cuba, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 1–2 (2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/cuba_6.pdf.  
 42. John W. Smagulat, Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and 
Resolving the Stalemate, 21 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 65, 67 (1995–1996) [hereinafter Smagu-
lat]. 
 43. Hufbauer, supra note 6, at 1. 
 44. The Economic Impact of U.S. Sanctions with Respect to Cuba, Inv. No. 332-413, USITC 
Pub. 3398, 5-31 (Feb. 2001) (Final) [hereinafter USITC]. 
 45. Id. at 5-37, 5-38. 
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the Soviet Union.46 The United States government hoped that by apply-
ing economic pressure on Cuba through the sanctions that Fidel Castro 
would change his behavior towards the United States, sever ties with the 
Soviet Union, and align itself with the democratic, free-market countries 
of the West. Unfortunately for the United States, the desired result did 
not occur. In retaliation to these initial sanctions, Cuba passed the Na-
tional Law on July 6, 1960, which authorized Cuba to nationalize all 
interests owned by Americans in Cuba, without regard to the amount 
owned by the American citizen.47 The National Law specifically cites 
interference from the United States government in Cuban economic af-
fairs as justification for the law.  
The attitude assumed by the Government and legislative power of 
the United States of America of constant aggression for political purpos-
es against the fundamental interests of the Cuban economy...obliges the 
Revolutionary Government to adopt without hesitation, also measures 
that it may deem pertinent for the defense of the national sovereignty and 
the free economic development of our country.48 
This law provided Cuba with the legal means to expropriate proper-
ty owned by United States nationals in Cuba. Using the National Law, 
the Cuban government nationalized all American owned industries and 
expropriated all American owned property in Cuba by October 5, 1960.49 
This nationalization provided the central rationale for the implementation 
of the trade embargo: fair and equitable compensation by the Cuban gov-
ernment to American property owners for their confiscated property.50  
Although the United States never questioned the right of the Cuban 
government to expropriate,51 the process and outcomes were.52 The un-
willingness of the Cuban government to provide prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation was in violation of international law and was of 
  
 46. OSIEJA, supra note 10, at 72. 
 47. Cuba:  Nationalization Law, 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 822, 822–24 (1961) (English translation). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Smagulat, supra note 42, at 75 (as of February 3, 2015, the amount if awards established 
by the U.S. Foreign Settlement Claims Commission for Cuba is $1,902,202,248.95 in principal.  
These settlement claims will be discussed later in the paper); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE:  FOREIGN 
CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM’N OF THE U.S., http://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2015 9:43 AM).  
 50. See Smagulat, supra note 42 at 75. 
 51. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962) (it is generally accepted international law that 
because of state sovereignty, each state has the right to nationalize, expropriate, or requisition prop-
erty within its borders.  However, this right is conditioned by the requirement of the host country to 
exercise due process, act in good faith, and provide appropriate compensation; for further discussion 
on the issue expropriation in international law see G.C. Christie, What Constitutes A Taking of 
Property Under International Law?, 38 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 307 (1962)). 
 52. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (establishing the rule in the 
United States that courts should refrain from passing judgment on the validity of confiscations under 
international law out of deference to the other branches.  The United States government possesses 
adequate means to respond to such acts and if it chooses not to it is in the “judgment of the national 
interest”). 
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great concern to the United States government. The refusal of the Cuban 
government to address the claims of American property owners provided 
the United States the reasoning to institute the initial measures of the 
trade embargo. This rationale, while becoming secondary in many ways 
to the other rationales mentioned above, has remained present in the 
minds of policymakers and politicians and has been a sticking point for 
both nations in regards to possible easing of trade restrictions. The Unit-
ed States government has set forth multiple regulations referencing the 
expropriations, including the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.53 That act 
specifically refers to Cuba and property rights: 
No assistance shall be furnished under this [Act] to any government 
of Cuba . . . until the President determines that such government has 
taken appropriate steps according to international law standards to re-
turn to United States citizens . . . or to provide equitable compensa-
tion to such citizens and entities for property taken . . . on or after 
January 1, 1959, by the government of Cuba.54 
The most recent legislation regarding the embargo in Cuba also 
mentions the property taken by the Castro regime. The Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996,55 more commonly 
known as Helms-Burton, after the members of Congress who sponsored 
the bill,56 specifically sets the protection of American property in Cuba 
as a purpose of the Act. The act states specifically that one of its purpos-
es is “to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and 
the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.” 
The Helms-Burton Act also contains a provision titled “Protection of 
Property Rights of United States Nationals,” which states as one of its 
findings that “the wrongful confiscation or taking of property belonging 
to United States nationals by the Cuban Government, and the subsequent 
exploitation of this property at the expense of the rightful owner, under-
mines the comity of nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic 
development.”57 It continues to stipulate that the “United States Govern-
ment has an obligation to its citizens to provide protection against 
wrongful confiscations by foreign nations and their citizens, including 
the provision of private remedies.”58  
The United States has also set up a mechanism for American citi-
zens to register claims against the government of Cuba for their expro-
  
 53. Act of Sept. 4, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1998). 
 54. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (2012). 
 55. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–91 (2012). 
 56. Andrew Mihalik, The Cuban Embargo:  A Ship Weathering the Storm of Globalization 
and International Trade, 12 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 98, 98 (2003) (U.S. Senator Jesse Helms 
(R-North Carolina) and U.S. Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana) co-sponsored Helms-Burton on 
February 2, 1995). 
 57. 22 U.S.C. § 6081(2) (2012). 
 58. 22 U.S.C. § 6081(10) (2012). 
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priated property. Under the International Claims Settlement Act of 
1949,59 the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission adjudicates claims 
on behalf of United States nationals against foreign governments. Title V 
of that act specifically empowers the commission to determine the 
amount and validity of claims against the government of Cuba that have 
arisen since January 1, 1959,60 based upon the following two criteria: 
1. losses resulting from the nationalization, expropriation, interven-
tion, or other taking of, or special measures directed against, property 
by that government; and 
2. the disability or death of nationals of the United States resulting 
from actions taken by or under the authority of that government.61 
The commission has completed two programs to determine the total 
amount of claims by United States nationals against the government of 
Cuba. The first program covered from the dates of January 1, 1959 to 
January 1, 196762 and the second program covered from the dates of May 
1, 1967 and August 11, 2006.63 These two programs validated 5,913 
claims amounting to roughly $1.9 billion in principal.64 Considering in-
flation from when Cuba seized the properties over forty years ago, the 
current value of these claims could be as high as $40 billion.65 This clear-
ly establishes, through legislative action, that the confiscation of Ameri-
can owned property in Cuba, along with the recovery of said property, 
continues to be a principal reason for the establishment and continuation 
of the embargo. 
Threat to United States National Security 
A second reason the United States has promulgated for the trade 
embargo against Cuba is that it is a matter of national security and it is 
necessary to prevent the spread of Communism, specifically in the West-
ern Hemisphere. The second half of that reason no longer exists with the 
fall of Soviet Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991. But prior to that, the threat of Communism was very real and the 
existence of a Communist country aligned with the Soviet Union sitting 
ninety miles off the shore of the United States was a genuine national 
security concern.  
  
 59. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621–45 (2012). 
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While the notion that a communist Cuba posed a security threat to 
the United States existed from the moment Castro aligned Cuba with the 
Soviet Union, clearly demonstrated by the desire of the United States to 
remove Castro and the efforts taken to accomplish that goal through the 
Bay of Pigs66 invasion, the real national security threat exposed itself 
with the discovery of medium-range ballistic missiles (MCBM) sites in 
Cuba by a U2 over flight.67 The discovery of Soviet MCBM’s in Cuba 
instigated what is widely known as the Cuban Missile Crisis,68 a thirteen-
day standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union over the 
placement of missiles and bombers in Cuba. This crisis made it apparent 
to the government of the United States that a communist Cuba aligned 
with the Soviet Union posed not only an economic threat to the United 
States but a national security threat as well. Thus, the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis created a significant amount of consternation in the United States 
government and further validating the implementation of the embargo 
within the halls of the Kennedy administration. 
Cuba’s alignment with the Soviet Union wasn’t the only reason the 
United States viewed it as a national security threat. The success of the 
Cuban revolution inspired and empowered the Cuban government with 
the motivation and enthusiasm to spread their revolutionary fervor to 
other parts of the world that it felt were ripe for revolution. The Cuban 
revolutionaries saw a world with extreme poverty, racial discrimination, 
underdevelopment, and injustice.69 High on their victory and pulsing 
with hubris and bravado, they believed they could export their revolution 
to the decolonization fights in process around the world.70  
The attempt by the Cuban government to export its revolutionary 
philosophy caused significant alarm in the United States. The United 
States government viewed Cuba’s support for revolutionary states and 
revolutionary movements, as well as its ties with Communist and non-
Communist Left, especially in Latin America, as a direct threat to not 
only its hegemony in the region but also the free-market and capitalist 
economic system that it fully supported. Cuba’s active involvement in 
revolutionary activities around the world provided even greater justifica-
tion for isolating the country diplomatically and economically, especially 
during the Reagan administration. 
  
 66. JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/The-Bay-of-Pigs.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2015 
11:11AM). (the invasion occurred on April 17, 1961). 
 67. Cuban Missile Crisis, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. AND INT’L AFFAIRS 
www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/timeline/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2015 11:15AM) (the flight 
occurred on October 14, 1962). 
 68. Id. 
 69. SWEIG, supra note 11, at 105. 
 70. Id. at 104. 
144 DENVER LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 93 
While the threat of the spread of Soviet Communism died with the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the opinion that Cuba posed a security threat to 
the United States persisted even after its demise. In passing the Helms-
Burton Act of 1996,71 the United States Congress stipulated in its find-
ings that one of the motivations for passing the act was that “for the past 
36 years, the Cuban Government has posed and continues to pose a na-
tional security threat to the United States”72 and that the “Castro gov-
ernment threatens international peace and security by engaging in acts of 
armed subversion and terrorism, such as the training and supplying of 
groups dedicated to international violence.”73 Thus, with the fall of the 
Soviet Union, the national security rationale morphed into a concern 
about the Cuban government’s continued support for revolutionary 
movements around the world, its alleged74 support for terrorism, and the 
threat of mass migration of Cubans across the Straits of Florida. 
The possibility of a mass exodus of Cuban refugees to the United 
States is not only real, but also a reality that the United States has experi-
enced in the past on more than one occasion. The existence of large-scale 
immigration to the United States by Cubans has existed for years, predat-
ing the Cuban Revolution in 1958. As opposition to the dictatorship of 
Fulgencio Batista increased and spread across the island in the late 
1950s, the flow of immigrants to the United States increased. With the 
fall of Batista, the profile of immigrants shifted and became predomi-
nately composed of loyalists to his regime who feared retribution by the 
Revolutionary government. After Castro came to power, the profile 
shifted again, and the number of immigrants increased dramatically.75 
Many people started immigrating because they opposed the Castro re-
gime or were concerned about life opportunities in Cuba as it moved 
steadily toward communism.76  
In response to the desire of Cubans to immigrate to the United 
States, along with the corresponding desire of the United States to wel-
come them and demonstrate that the Cuban Revolution was a failure, 
United States immigration policy toward Cuba was and is extremely re-
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laxed in comparison to the United States immigration policy towards 
other countries.77 Cuban exiles are generally admitted under the Attorney 
General’s powers of parole, “most without immigrant visas, security 
checks or confirmed means of financial support required by other immi-
grants.”78 The passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA)79 in 1966 
adjusted this policy slightly, which essentially clarified and continued the 
executive policy of admitting Cubans that had previously been in place.  
Under the CAA, as amended, any Cuban admitted or paroled into 
the United States and present for at least one year can adjust to perma-
nent resident status—an opportunity that no other group or nationality 
has.80 This has had the practical effect of allowing essentially any Cuban 
admitted at the border to become permanent residents.  
In the late 1970s, the Cuban economy was suffering due to the stag-
nant centralized bureaucracy, declining workforce motivation, and the 
spike in oil prices. Along with increased exposure to new ideas and out-
side perspectives and realities because of the end of the travel ban by the 
Carter administration, many Cubans reevaluated their own society and 
questioned Cuba’s vilification of the United States, as well as Cuban 
exiles living in the United States.81 This change in perspective increased 
migratory pressures on the Cuban populace and precipitated the first ma-
jor migration movement between Cuba and the United States since the 
early days of the Cuban Revolution. 
The Mariel boatlift was the first time the Cuban government opened 
a port to anyone wishing to depart the country since Cuba and the United 
States had agreed to allow Cubans to fly from Cuba to Miami on United 
States government chartered “Freedom Flight” in 1965.82 Responding to 
the growing political crisis in Cuba and the desire of large numbers of 
Cubans to leave Cuba, Castro opened the port of Mariel and allowed all 
who wished to leave the country to do so. President Carter responded by 
declaring, “Ours is a country of refugees . . . . We’ll continue to provide 
an open heart and open arms to refugees seeking freedom from com-
munist domination.”83 Between April and October 1980, roughly 
125,000 Cubans migrated to the United States in small boats, many or-
ganized by the Cuban exile community in Miami.84 Along with allowing 
any Cuban to leave the country, Castro also released significant numbers 
of prisoners and mental patients, leading the mayor of Miami to quip, 
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“Fidel has just flushed his toilet on us.”85 The boatlift also caused a sig-
nificant financial strain on the United States, costing the United States 
over $250-million to receive and resettle the refugees in the first year 
alone.86 
Mass migration from Cuba to the United States occurred again in 
the mid-1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subse-
quent contracting of the Cuban economy, large numbers of Cubans 
wished to leave the country. Thousands of “balseros,” or rafters, took to 
the sea in an attempt to reach the shores of Florida.87 Fidel Castro ac-
cused the United Sates in fostering the desire of Cubans to leave the 
country and threatened to open the ports and allow large numbers to mi-
grate if the United States didn’t help deter illegal boat departures.88 The 
ensuing migration crisis resulted in the Cuban Migration Agreement of 
1994,89 which established what is popularly known as the “Wet Foot-Dry 
Foot” policy. This policy required the United States government to repat-
riate Cubans interdicted on the open seas, a change in the policy that 
previously existed, which allowed all Cubans the right to reach American 
shore, in spite of where American officials intercepted them. However, it 
continued to allow those Cubans who were fortunate enough to elude 
United States’ officials and reach American shores to gain immediate 
clearance as legal immigrants.90 
The periodic migration issues experienced by the United States 
since the Cuban Revolution has made it apparent that such migration can 
represent a national security threat to the United States. The close prox-
imity of Cuba to the United Sates, along with the desire for large num-
bers of Cubans to leave the island and Castro’s willingness to use migra-
tion as threat or weapon to manipulate the United States,91 presents a 
unique and continuing challenge to the United States, helping to justify 
the continued implementation of the embargo in the minds of American 
officials. 
The Humanitarian Rationale for the Embargo  
A third reason promulgated by the United States government for the 
continuation of the trade embargo against Cuba, especially since the fall 
of the Soviet Union, is one rooted in humanitarianism. The establishment 
of democracy on the island, the implementation of free market capital-
ism, and the protection of human rights have largely replaced the ra-
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tionale of national security as the most significant reason for the perpetu-
ation of the embargo. The stated policy of the United States government 
in passing the Cuban Democracy Act included an intention to “seek a 
peaceful transition to democracy and a resumption of economic growth . 
. . to continue vigorously to oppose the human rights violations of the 
Castro regime” and “to encourage free and fair elections to determine 
Cuba’s political future.”92 The Helms-Burton Act cited the “repression of 
the Cuban people, including a ban on free and fair democratic elections, 
and continuing violations of fundamental human rights,”93 specifically 
“torture in various forms . . . as well as execution, exile, confiscation, 
political imprisonment, and other forms of terror repression”94 as a justi-
fication for its passage. 
Almost since the beginning of the Castro regime, the United States 
has accused it of human rights abuses, including the use of torture and 
mass incarceration of the regime’s political opponents. The United States 
maintained its accusations towards Cuba for human rights abuses 
throughout the Cold War but really began to focus on them as a reason 
for continuing, even strengthening the embargo after the end of the Cold 
War. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Cold 
War, the United States’ foreign policy altered its focus generally from 
fighting communism to humanitarian interests, especially focused on 
political and civil rights. In an effort to consolidate its victory over com-
munism and increase globalization, the United States placed greater em-
phasis on the spread of democracy and free-market economics to help the 
developing world progress politically and economically.95 This was ap-
parent when the administration of George W. Bush published a report, 
which argued that Cubans suffered tremendous human rights abuses, 
including lack of basic necessities and absence of political rights. The 
report argued that the United States’ policy should be the hastening of 
the end of the Castro regime and the transition to democracy and free 
market economics, even suggesting possible policy initiatives and ac-
tions by the United States government may take in support of those ob-
jectives.96 These actions were part of a larger policy espoused by the 
Bush administrations, centered on the goal of spreading democracy 
around the world. The United States hoped that if the developing world 
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could make dramatic progress in these areas, then the entire world would 
be safer and more secure.97 
Effects of the Embargo on Cuba  
Before the Cuban Revolution and the ascension of Fidel Castro to 
power in Cuba, the United States was Cuba’s largest trading partner and 
heavily involved in all matters of Cuban affairs. In 1958, the United 
States accounted for sixty-seven percent of Cuba’s exports and seventy 
percent of Cuba’s imports.98 Among those exports was sugar, which the 
United States received 2.9-million metric tons of from Cuba in 1959, 
amounting to seventy-two percent of the United States’ import quota for 
sugar.99  
The implementation of the economic embargo had far-reaching ef-
fects on the Cuban economy and by extension, the Cuban population. 
Prior to the embargo, the United States had been Cuba’s largest trading 
partner and a source of supply for most of the materials used in the Cu-
ban economy. These items included both food items and medicines, but 
also manufacturing parts and machinery. All sectors of Cuban society 
felt the effect on the Cuban economy from the embargo. Cubans experi-
enced a shortage of dietary items such as chicken, rice, and pork, affect-
ing their eating habits and forcing them to look for alternatives.100  
The unavailability of American food production technology and 
equipment and the lack of medications was another consequence of the 
embargo. These shortages, or complete unavailability, forced Cubans to 
look elsewhere for alternatives or replacements, creating a separate set of 
problems. Cuba was forced to import alternatives from locations that 
could be great distances away, increasing transportation costs exponen-
tially.101 Also, because of the nature of the relationship between the 
United States and Cuba prior to the Cuban Revolution and the heavy 
United States involvement in the Cuban economy, most of the heavy 
machinery in Cuba was American, as well as private property, such as 
Chevy cars. The embargo prevented the importation of replacement parts 
and new machinery from the United States, forcing Cuba to find re-
placements elsewhere. This was typically accomplished through the So-
viet Union or one of its allies. Unfortunately for Cuba, much of this re-
placement machinery was unsuited for work in the local, tropical climate 
and was therefore practically useless.102 These deficiencies caused the 
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Cuban population to be less efficient, which also contributed to the de-
cline in production. 
After assuming power, the government of Fidel Castro began to im-
plement measures to transform the economy and turn Cuba into a social-
ist country. Some of the measures included nationalizing the means of 
production, reorganizing the public sector for direct management of pro-
duction and trade, and centralizing the planning of virtually all-economic 
activity.103 This shift in the Cuban economy coincided with the increased 
cooperation and alignment between Cuba and the Soviet Union. This 
relationship would be the cornerstone of Cuban economic policy and the 
lifeblood for the Cuban economy during the Cold War, allowing it to 
withstand much of the effects intended by the embargo. Massive Soviet 
economic assistance dominated the Cuban economy between 1960 and 
1989, which is estimated to have peaked at $6-billion annually in the late 
1980s.104 The economic assistance provided by the Soviet Union and its 
bloc of allies consisted of guaranteed export markets for Cuba’s main 
exports of sugar and nickel, long-term supply and delivery agreements 
with prices set on terms favorable to Cuba, and trade credits to support 
Cuba’s ability to import other needed products.105 The support of the 
Soviet Union and its allies dampened the effect of the embargo on Cuba, 
insulating it from United States influence and allowing it to pursue its 
revolutionary policies. 
The fall of the Soviet Union drove Cuba into a severe economic cri-
sis, forcing it to make economic adjustments, described by Fidel Castro 
as the “special period in a time of peace.”106 With the loss of its largest 
trading partner, between 1991 and 1994, Cuban trade collapsed and the 
gross domestic product (GDP) declined by about a third.107 The decline 
in trade led to a shortage of major necessities, such as foreign exchange, 
electricity, water, medicines, and food. The Cuban government respond-
ed to this crisis by attempting to stimulate production and consumption, 
implementing some measured reforms relating to employment, agricul-
tural production and private enterprise, and foreign capital and invest-
ment.108 Many of these reforms were either unsuccessful in transforming 
the economy or were abandoned in the late 1990s. This presented the 
first time that Cuba had been fully exposed to the sanctions and the cor-
responding consequences intended by American officials when they in-
stituted the first sanctions in 1960.  
However, the rude economic awakening in Cuba would be rather 
short lived, because in 2000 Cuba found a partial replacement for the 
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loss of the Soviet Union’s political and economic support. Venezuela, 
and its sympathetic president, Hugo Chavez, became Cuba’s new bene-
factor. The two countries established the Convenio Integral de Coopera-
cion, or comprehensive cooperation agreement, which provided to Cuba 
a significant amount of oil (between 90,000 and 130,000 barrels per day), 
at a forty percent discount supplemented by a subsidized loan, the value 
of which is estimated at about $1.5-billion per year and covered about 
half of Cuba’s energy needs.109 Cuba and Venezuela also negotiated a 
deal that provided for Cuba to deliver to Venezuela, Cuban doctors to 
work in Venezuela’s misiones, often at a highly inflated value,110 as well 
as creating Operation Miracle, an initiative under which Cuban doctors 
provide eye surgery to thousands of poor Latin Americans annually.111 
While the total investment of Venezuela into the Cuban economy can’t 
be accurately determined because of the lack of transparency, it is esti-
mated to range between $10-billion to $13-billion annually between 
2010 and 2013, including the oil for doctors program and other develop-
ment assistance.112 
The economic assistance provided by Venezuela after 2000 was 
crucial to the survival of the Castro regime, providing much needed for-
eign exchange and oil. It reestablished the dome of security from United 
States sanctions that Cuba had lost at the end of the Cold War, protecting 
it from attempts by the United States to force change through the embar-
go. However, the death of Hugo Chavez and the decline in oil revenues 
has reduced the amount of money that Venezuela has provided to Cuba, 
requiring the Cuban government to liberalize its economy, and exposing 
it once again to the consequences of the embargo.  
China has also played a role in helping the Cuban government since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, providing Cuba with interest free loans, 
credit lines, and investment in its petroleum infrastructure. China has 
invested in Cuba’s health infrastructure, upgraded hospitals and research 
facilities, and built broadband cable between Venezuela and Cuba.113 
However, the reduction in the support from Venezuela, along with 
the retirement of Fidel Castro and the ascension of his brother, Raul, to 
the presidency has created the political space needed for the Cuban gov-
ernment to implement some modifications in the central planned econo-
my and to reform to a more market oriented one. Since the Cuban revolu-
tion, the Cuban economy has operated predominately under a centrally 
planned system, controlled by the single party communist government. 
State-owned enterprises have dominated domestic production of goods, 
  
 109. Id. at 16. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Laurie Garrett, Castrocare in Crisis:  Will Lifting the Embargo Make Things Worse?, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-August 2010, at 69. 
 112. HUFBAUER & KOTSCHWAR, supra note 65, at 16. 
 113. Id. at 19. 
2016] END OF THE EMBARGO 151 
while government institutions have tightly regulated international trade 
and domestic consumption.114 Throughout its reign, the Castro regime 
has taken certain measures and altered or abolished certain rules to allow 
for more freedom of choice in the market.115 The rise to power of Raul 
Castro, first, temporarily in 2006 because of the health issues of Fidel, 
and then permanently when Fidel resigned the presidency in 2008, has 
coincided with the largest economic reforms since the establishment of 
the revolutionary government in 1959. When he came to power, Raul 
Castro publicly acknowledged deficiencies in the Cuban economy and 
the need for economic reform. His government began to implement a 
series of changes focused on increasing individual consumer rights and 
improving economic productivity.116  
Effects of the Embargo on United States  
The effects of the embargo on the United States are more apparent 
in terms of political and social impact, both domestically and interna-
tionally, than in terms of direct economic impact on American citizens 
and industries. The United States has endured decades of international 
condemnation relating to its policy towards Cuba, as well as years of 
domestic political conflict, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the end of the consensus that coincided with the fight against com-
munism. The United States has prevented its citizens from traveling to 
Cuba, except in specific situations in which the person acquired a special 
license, because of the tourism ban.117 That is not to say that the embargo 
hasn’t affected the United States economically, as it has certainly suf-
fered economic loss from the periodic migration crises and the lack of 
access to Cuban markets or educated workforce by American businesses. 
Compliance with the sanctions has also increased the cost of doing busi-
ness for American companies. However, the political and social effects 
of the embargo on the United States are arguably both more apparent and 
more extensive.  
When the United States initially instituted the embargo, it enjoyed a 
large consensus of support around the world in condemning Cuba’s be-
havior and establishing sanctions in order to encourage Cuba to abandon 
its relationship with the Soviet Union. The United States was successful 
in its attempt to alienate Cuba from much of Latin America, when, in 
1964, the OAS passed a resolution requiring all member states to break 
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diplomatic relations and cease all trade with Cuba.118 The United States 
was also successful in alienating Cuba from the World Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), preventing it from acquiring the capi-
tal and investment resources available to member states of those organi-
zations in developing their economies.119  
Over time, the consensus built by the United States government, 
both internationally and domestically, has eroded. By 1975, the OAS 
voted to allow its members to engage Cuba diplomatically and resume 
trade relations, and in 2009 the OAS voted to allow Cuba to rejoin the 
organization as a full member.120  
The United States also faced growing opposition to the embargo 
and the effect of laws passed by the United States Congress by other 
members of the international community. Since the end of the Cold War, 
Canada, along with many members of the European Union, especially 
Spain, have invested in Cuba and attempted to engage it in dialogue 
about its human rights and democracy, choosing a policy of engagement 
over one of isolation.121 This inclination only increased after the retire-
ment of Fidel and the rise to power of Raul Castro, further isolating the 
United States in its policy towards Cuba. With the retirement of Fidel 
Castro, the United States arguably lost its most compelling argument for 
the continuation of the embargo, his removal from power. Historically, 
Fidel and Raul Castro act similarly, and even though Raul succeeded 
Fidel as President of Cuba, Raul’s immediate recognition of problems in 
the Cuban economy and the need for systemic changes in it demonstrate 
a clear desire for Cuba to transition away from its historical, centrally 
planned economy and into a more market-oriented one.122  
The United Nations is another venue where the United States has 
faced international opposition to the embargo. Again, the position of 
foreign governments on the embargo can be separated into before the fall 
of the Soviet Union and after its demise. During the Cold War, the Unit-
ed States could count on most of the world on to support it in its econom-
ic warfare with Cuba because it was part of the larger fight against com-
munism. Cuba was seen as the front line, especially in the Western Hem-
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isphere, in the war between capitalist countries versus communist ones. 
However, after the communist threat had passed, the justification for the 
embargo was much harder for the international community to rationalize 
for international peace and security. As a result, its support for isolating 
Cuba has wavered. With the end of the threat of communist takeover, 
most countries decided that engagement was a better policy towards the 
remaining communist countries than the previous policy of isolation. The 
increased cooperation between Cuba, Canada, and several members of 
the European Union demonstrates this engagement policy, as well as by 
the successive votes against the embargo in the U.N. General Assembly. 
Every year since 1991, the U.N. General Assembly has passed a resolu-
tion condemning the embargo, with 191 countries voting against it on 
October 27, 2015. Only Israel joined the United States in voting against 
the resolution.123 
Domestic political disagreement over the embargo has had a serious 
effect on the United States. The largely unified and politically active 
Cuban-American population, in both southern Florida and New Jersey, 
exercised a tremendous amount of influence on the policy toward Cuba, 
especially in the decade after the fall of the Soviet Union. Because of its 
unified voice and dominant political position in Florida, a presidential 
swing state, the Cuban-American population was able to greatly influ-
ence policy towards Cuba, forcing both Presidential candidates and Pres-
idents to pander to their wishes.124 Since the majority of the Cuban-
American population that resides in the United States are exiles because 
of their support of Batista or opposition to Castro, their positions are 
decidedly anti-Castro and pro-embargo. This political reality created an 
atmosphere where the Cuban-American population in the United States 
met any attempt at rapprochement between the two counties with visceral 
opposition by, largely preventing any substantial change in the relation-
ship. 
A New Day: Changing the Relationship 
On December 17, 2014, the White House announced major altera-
tions to the United States policy toward Cuba and the Castro regime. 
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Acknowledging the failure of American economic policy towards Cuba 
in deposing of the Castro brothers from power and the strain that policy 
has imposed on the United States’ relationship with countries all over the 
world, including many allies, the administration of Barack Obama de-
clared a new policy of engagement with Cuba to “further engage and 
empower the Cuban people.”125 The statement released by the Obama 
administration continued:  
It is clear that decades of U.S. isolation of Cuba have failed to ac-
complish our enduring objective of promoting the emergence of a 
democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba. At times, longstanding U.S. 
policy towards Cuba has isolated the United States from regional and 
international partners, constrained our ability to influence outcomes 
throughout the Western Hemisphere, and impaired the use of the full 
range of tools available to the United States to promote positive 
change in Cuba. Though this policy has been rooted in the best of in-
tentions, it has had little effect—today, as in 1961, Cuba is governed 
by the Castros and the Communist party. 
We cannot keep doing the same thing and expect a different result. It 
does not serve America’s interests, or the Cuban people, to try to 
push Cuba toward collapse. We know from hard-learned experience 
that it is better to encourage and support reform than to impose poli-
cies that will render a country a failed state. With our actions today, 
we are calling on Cuba to unleash the potential of 11 million Cubans 
by ending unnecessary restrictions on their political, social, and eco-
nomic activities.126 
Even though the Helms-Burton Act codified the embargo and re-
quired an act of Congress to remove most of the provisions regulating 
trade with Cuba, the President retains extensive latitude within that 
framework to adjust rules and regulations in order to loosen the embargo 
and allow for some limited economic activity and cooperation between 
Americans and Cubans. Most of the embargo is controlled by the Treas-
ury Department through the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 
(CACR)127 and through these procedures the President retains broad au-
thority to amend the regulations despite the requirement of Congression-
al action to remove the embargo.128 In announcing the changes to Cuban-
American policy, the President exercised those prerogatives, altering the 
regulations to allow for ease of travel to the island, increasing and facili-
tating remittances to Cuba, authorizing expanded commercial sales and 
exports from the United States of certain goods and services, authorizing 
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American citizens to import additional goods from Cuba, facilitating 
authorized transactions between the United States and Cuba,129 and initi-
ating new efforts to increase Cubans’ access to communications by al-
lowing American telecommunications companies to provide data and 
mobile phone service to Cuba.130 
The President also moved to restore diplomatic relations with Cu-
ba131 and remove it from the state sponsor of terrorism list.132 Diplomatic 
relations had been severed between the two countries since President 
Eisenhower ordered it on January 3, 1961,133 after Fidel Castro pro-
claimed his allegiance to Marxist-Leninism and declared the Cuban revo-
lution as socialist.134 The administration of President Jimmy Carter took 
steps to soften the embargo and restore diplomatic relations by opening 
diplomatic interest sections in both Washington and Havana as well as 
ending the travel ban, with the ultimate objective being the full restora-
tion of trade and diplomatic relations.135 Ultimately, President Carter’s 
attempts at reconciliation were either rolled back or left to wither after 
his defeat by Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election. The refu-
gee crisis caused by the Mariel boatlift and Cuba’s involvement in revo-
lutionary activities,136 combined with President Reagan’s strong anti-
communist position didn’t allow for any continued cooperation between 
the two countries. President Reagan reversed many of the changes initi-
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ated by President Carter, including the reinstatement of the travel ban. 
His steps to re-tighten the embargo and general belief that the only way 
to beat communism was to ratchet up the stakes would end any notion of 
rapprochement for decades. 
Further complicating the relationship between the United States and 
Cuba, President Reagan placed Cuba on the list of state sponsors of ter-
rorism in 1982.137 It cited Cuba’s role in supporting leftist insurgents in 
Latin America as its reasoning for the designation.138 This justification 
has lost weight over the years as Cuba stopped training and funding left-
ist rebel groups. A 1997 review of Cuba by the entire United States intel-
ligence community concluded that Cuba no longer constituted a threat to 
American national security.139 That report, prepared by the Defense In-
telligence Agency, stated, “[a]t present, Cuba does not pose a significant 
military threat to the U.S. or to other countries in the region.”140  
Nevertheless, Cuba remained on the state sponsors of terrorism list 
until the summer of 2015. The reasoning has evolved over the years and 
Cuba’s continued inclusion on the list has most recently been attributed 
to its existence as a haven for members of the Basque separatist group 
ETA as well as Columbia’s left-wing FARC141 rebel group.142  
The removal of Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism by 
the Obama administration ends certain sanctions that automatically trig-
ger when a country is designated a supporter of terrorism, allowing for 
greater opportunity for cooperation between the United States and Cuba 
and eliminating certain obstacles for assistance, especially in the form of 
economic aid.  
The retirement of Fidel Castro has also created a greater opportunity 
for rapprochement between the two countries within Cuba itself. His 
absence from power has removed a powerful voice of criticism of both 
the United States and the embargo itself. Since the enactment of the em-
bargo, Fidel has used it as an excuse and scapegoat for all manner of ills 
that besieged the island. His regime has successfully exploited the em-
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bargo by denouncing the measures as foreign aggression and calling for a 
“rally-round-the-flag” as the only remedy to counteract the United States 
“assault” on Cuba’s national sovereignty.143 He has successfully manipu-
lated the majority of the population into opposing the embargo not be-
cause they disagree with regime and the goals of the revolution, but be-
cause it deprives them of American goods and contacts with exiled 
friends and family members.144 
The actions taken by the Obama administration to improve the rela-
tionship between Cuba and the United States have been met with ap-
proval and condemnation. Much of the reaction can be divided along 
party lines. By and large, the Democratic Party has supported the move-
ment to engage Cuba while the Republican Party has condemned it.145 
However, most of the American public supports improved relations and 
agrees with the Obama administration that it is time to change the policy. 
A Pew Research Center poll conducted January 7-11, 2015 showed that 
sixty-six percent of Americans supported President Obama’s changes to 
American policy towards Cuba, and sixty-six percent favored ending the 
embargo altogether.146 These conditions, along with several other devel-
opments in both the domestic and international political arenas, provide a 
unique opportunity for the United States to reset its relationship with 
Cuba, reestablish its moral hegemony in the region, and improve the 
lives of millions of Cubans in the process. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States has maintained a policy of containment and isola-
tion against Cuba since it first instituted sanctions in 1960, a period 
spanning over fifty years. Initially instituted as retaliation for confiscated 
American property by the Cuban government after the Cuban Revolu-
tion, the reasoning for the continuation of the embargo has evolved 
through the national security lens of the Cold War to the spread of de-
mocracy and basic human rights in the era of globalization. Despite the 
evolving reasoning, the objective of the policy has always been the re-
moval of the Castro brothers from power and an adjustment in the Cuban 
government’s behavior toward its own citizens, as well as the rest of the 
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world. However, today a Castro is still in power, the Cuban government 
is still identified as communist, and no expropriated American property 
has been returned nor compensated for. Not one single purpose that has 
ever been articulated for the embargo has been achieved. Therefore, by 
almost any measure, the objective of the embargo has been a complete 
and total failure. It is time for the United States to repeal all aspects of 
the embargo and fully engage Cuba politically, diplomatically, and eco-
nomically. The Cuban people have suffered long enough because of a 
failed geopolitical strategy of the United States, which lost its justifica-
tion decades ago.  
The election of Barack Obama, the retirement of Fidel Castro, and 
increased domestic support for improved relations between the United 
States and Cuba, have allowed, for the first time in decades, the possibil-
ity for meaningful change to the policy and a rapprochement between the 
two countries. The United States should capitalize on the change of cir-
cumstances to reengage completely with Cuba, help it to remodel its so-
ciety to encourage free-market capitalism and democracy . 
Full engagement by the United States can help provide much need-
ed investment and capital to Cubans and their businesses, which would 
lead to expanded growth and improved living conditions. A large influx 
of Americans, either conducting business on the island or simply visiting 
as tourists, would also provide increased access to information and ideas 
that would help awaken and foster democratic tendencies, which have 
been sidelined during the Castro regime. It is time to end a failed policy 
that has only had the effect of hampering American businesses, restrict-
ing the travel and freedoms of American citizens, and isolating Cubans 
from much needed economic supplies, as well as exiled family and 
friends, depriving them of access to resources that would help them im-
prove their lives. The United States policy of embargoing Cuba has only 
hurt Cubans, failing to achieve the goals articulated by the United States 
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